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E.O. 11652: GDS, 12/31/79

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: OCTOBER 4 TEXT OF SECTIONS I-V OF "ALLIANCE APPROACH
TO NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR"

1. AS A RESULT OF SENIOR POLADS' DISCUSSIONS ON OCTOBER 3 & 4
INTERNATIONAL STAFF PRODUCED SINGLE DOCUMENT (CM(73)83)
COMPRISING ALL FIVE SECTIONS OF ALLIANCE APPROACH TO MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS. THIS DOCUMENT WAS THE BASIS FOR NAC AND SPC
DISCUSSION ON OCTOBER 5. SEE SEPTTEL FOR TEXT OF "CORRIGENDUM"
IDENTIFYING CHANGES WHICH SPC MADE IN CM(73)83 ON OCTOBER 5.

2. FULL TEXT OF CM(73)83 FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

ALLIANCE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR

INTRODUCTION

1. THE PRESENT DOCUMENT CONTAINS FIVE SECTIONS ENTITLED:

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I. THE GUIDELINES

II. THE ALLIED POSITION

III. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

IV. NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES

V. INTRA-ALLIANCE CO-ORDINATION

AND SETS OUT THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL APPROACH TO MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, AS AGREED AMONG THE ALLIES.

2. THE GUIDELINES PROVIDE THE STANDARD IN TERMS OF WHICH ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WILL DETERMINE ANY NEGOTIATING POSITION; AND AGAINST WHICH ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WILL MEASURE ANY SPECIFIC NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL. SECTION II SETS OUT THE BASIC ALLIED POSITION. SECTION III SUGGESTS THE WAYS IN WHICH THE ALLIES MIGHT PRESENT THEIR OWN VIEWS; EXPLORE THE THINKING OF THE OTHER SIDE; AND CONDUCT THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. SECTION IV SETS OUT THE PROCEDURES FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH THE ALLIES PREFER. SECTION V DEALS WITH OBJECTIVES AND PROCEDURES OF THE CONSULTATIVE PROGRAMME AMONG ALLIES IN BRUSSELS AND VIENNA.

I. THE GUIDELINES

PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES

3. THE ALLIED POSITION ON MBFR SHOULD AIM AT A BALANCED OUTCOME THAT WILL ENSURE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE AT A LOWER LEVEL FOR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE(1). BY UNDIMINISHED SECURITY IS MEANT THE MAINTENANCE, AND IF POSSIBLE, THE ENHANCEMENT, OF THE MILITARY SECURITY POSTURE OF THE ALLIANCE.

(1) UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES MAY ANY MEASURES TAKEN PRIOR TO, CONCURRENTLY WITH, OR SUBSEQUENT TO THE REDUCTIONS, OR ANY REDUCTIONS PROPER WHICH ARE AGREED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON FORCE REDUCTIONS, APPLY TO THE FRENCH FORCES STILL STATIONED IN THE FRG IN PURSUANCE OF THE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS OF 1966 BETWEEN THE BONN AND PARIS GOVERNMENTS. THESE FORCES HAVE NONETHELESS BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR INTERNAL CALCULATIONS OF ALLIED GROUND FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA.

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4. IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, ONE OF THE ALLIED AIMS SHOULD BE TO SEEK TO REDUCE MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND THUS TEST THE WARSAW PACT WILLINGNESS TO ADDRESS CONCRETE MILITARY SECURITY ISSUES, WHICH COULD PROMOTE REAL DETENTE.

5. MBFR MEASURES SHOULD NOT BE OF SUCH SCOPE AND MAGNITUDE AS TO DIMINISH THE ABILITY OF THE ALLIES TO TAKE THE NECESSARY MILITARY STEPS TO FULFIL CURRENTLY AGREED NATO STRATEGY: FORWARD DEFENCE, FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE.

GEOGRAPHIC AND RELATED CONCERNS

6. REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE CONFINED GEOGRAPHICALLY TO CENTRAL EUROPE.

PLUS EITHER: (THE GEOGRAPHICAL APPLICATION OF OTHER MEASURES AGREED IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD DEPEND ON THE NATURE AND CONTENT OF THESE MEASURES.)
OR: (OTHER MEASURES AGREED IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD EQUALLY BE CONFINED GEOGRAPHICALLY TO CENTRAL EUROPE.)

PLUS: THE SECURITY ISSUES ON THE FLANKS, IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND IN THE BALKANS ARE SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO AVOID EITHER PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE APPROACHES TO MBFR WHICH WOULD OPEN UP THESE OTHER AREAS FOR CONSIDERATION IN (THE MBFR PROGRAMME) OR (REDUCTIONS) OR INVOLVE COMMITMENTS TO ADDRESS THESE AREAS AT A SUBSEQUENT STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. THE ALLIED POSITION ON MBFR SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE RISKS INVOLVED IN THE CREATION OF A SPECIAL GEOGRAPHICALLY CONFINED ARMS CONTROL ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. MOREOVER, THE AREA FOR THE MBFR PROGRAMME MUST NOT BE LIMITED IN EAST AND WEST ONLY TO THE TERRITORIES OF THE TWO STATES IN GERMANY.

8. NEITHER THE CONDUCT NOR THE OUTCOME OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO INHIBIT THE AGREED PROGRAMME FOR THE CREATION OF A EUROPEAN UNION OR THE GROWTH OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE CO-OPERATION. EASTERN INFLUENCE, THROUGH MBFR AGREEMENTS AND PROCEDURES, ON WESTERN SECURITY STRUCTURE SHOULD BE AVOIDED, OR AT LEAST KEPT TO A MINIMUM AND ADMITTED ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS.

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9. THE FORTHCOMING MBFR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD ALSO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON THE SECURITY OF NATO'S FLANKS OF FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

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REDUCTIONS

10. IN PURSUIT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, THE ALLIED APPROACH TO MBFR SHOULD BE AIMED AT REDUCING THE ASYMMETRIES IN THE MILITARY BALANCE FAVOURING THE WARSAW PACT (THE SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND OFFENSIVE ORIENTATION OF PACT FORCES) AND MITIGATING THE GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN REINFORCEMENT. THUS THE ALLIED OBJECTIVES IN MBFR SHOULD BE BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITY AND THE REDUCTION OF ELEMENTS IN THE WARSAW PACT POSTURE MOST THREATENING TO NATO SECURITY.

11. GIVEN THE SUPERIORITY OF SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH IN THAT AREA MUST BE A PRIMARY AIM. THIS AIM SHOULD BE SOUGHT THROUGH AN OVERALL MBFR PROGRAMME OF TWO PHASES, LEADING TOWARDS APPROXIMATE PARITY IN NATO AND WP GROUND (MANPOWER) (FORCES) IN THE FORM OF A COMMON CEILING. ALLIED OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THE FIRST PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS TO
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ACHIEVING A REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA. REDUCTIONS OF OTHER NATO FORCES WILL BE LEFT TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS COMPLETING MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE COMMON CEILING.

12. REDUCTIONS ON THE ALLIED SIDE SHOULD NOT EXCEED APPROXIMATELY TEN PER CENT IN TOTAL STATIONED OR TEN PER CENT IN TOTAL INDIGENOUS MANPOWER.

PHASING

13. PHASING IS INTENDED TO ENSURE THAT MBFR IS NEGOTIATED AND IMPLEMENTED IN A CONTROLLED AND CALCULABLE PROCESS WITH LIMITED OBJECTIVES AND ACCEPTABLE RESULTS.

OTHER MBFR MEASURES (CONSTRAINTS, VERIFICATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION)

14. CONSTRAINTS SHOULD BE PART OF THE MBFR PROCESS. ANY REDUCTIONS MUST BE COMPLEMENTED BY APPROPRIATE CONSTRAINTS. THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE SHOULD INCLUDE APPROPRIATE PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS BUT AGREEMENT ON PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS SHOULD

NOT BE A CONDITION TO THE NEGOTIATION OF REDUCTIONS. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONSTRAINTS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT THE LATEST SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE FIRST WITHDRAWALS. NO WITHDRAWALS OR REDUCTIONS WOULD THEREFORE TAKE PLACE UNTIL SOME AGREEMENT ON CONSTRAINTS AND VERIFICATION HAD BEEN REACHED. (THE GEOGRAPHICAL APPLICATION OF CONSTRAINTS MIGHT NOT BE THE SAME AS THAT OF REDUCTION AGREEMENTS.)(1)

(1) THE TEXT IN BRACKETS CAN BE DELETED IF THE FIRST OPTION IN PARAGRAPH 6 IS ADOPTED.

15. ANY MBFR AGREEMENT MUST CONTAIN APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS, INCLUDING NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL MEANS, BEARING IN MIND THAT THE MODALITIES AND EXTENT OF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING INSPECTION, SHOULD DEPEND ON THE CONTENT AND NATURE OF THE AGREEMENTS REACHED. NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF MBFR AGREEMENTS. ANY MBFR AGREEMENT SHOULD BE VERIFIABLE WITHOUT ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATED
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PROVISIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION. IT IS NEVERTHELESS DESIRABLE TO SEEK MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION PROVISIONS.

16. AN IMPORTANT GOAL OF THE ALLIED APPROACH TO MBFR SHOULD BE TO ENSURE, THROUGH APPROPRIATE MEASURES, THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ANY MBFR AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED OR UNDERMINED, FOR EXAMPLE BY MEANS OF AN INCREASE OF THE LEVEL OF STATIONED FORCES AND THEIR EQUIPMENT IN HUNGARY. THE QUESTION OF HUNGARY'S INCLUSION IN A CONSTRAINTS AGREEMENT SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN. WAYS MUST BE FOUND TO DEAL WITH THESE VALID MILITARY CONCERNS.

17. WHILE DEALING WITH THE PROBLEMS ABOVE, THE ALLIES SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTEREST OF THE FLANK COUNTRIES AND THE INDIVISIBILITY OF THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE. A DECISION OF ANY ALLIED FLANK COUNTRY OR COUNTRIES NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN RESTRICTIONS WHICH WOULD BE PART OF AN AGREEMENT ON FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD BE SUPPORTED BY THE ALLIES.

FORCE IMPROVEMENTS

18. THE ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE THEIR FORCES AND TO TAKE STEPS TO ENHANCE ALLIANCE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES DURING THE MBFR PROCESS. THE APPROPRIATE BODIES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE SHOULD EXAMINE ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PROGRAMME OF IMPROVEMENTS WHICH, IN CONJUNCTION WITH AD 70, COULD COMPLEMENT THE NEGOTIATING EFFORTS. THE ALLIES ARE ALSO CONVINCED THAT THE SUCCESS OF MBFR WOULD BE SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED BY UNILATERAL ALLIED REDUCTIONS OR WITHDRAWALS IMPLEMENTED OUTSIDE ITS FRAMEWORK.

II. THE ALLIED POSITION

INTRODUCTION

19. THE POSITION DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS
DEFINES THE GOALS THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO SEEK
IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. ADJUSTMENT OF THIS POSITION, FOR
INSTANCE IN RESPONSE TO REQUIREMENTS OF THE NEGOTIATING
SITUATION, WOULD NECESSITATE A COLLECTIVE POLICY DECISION TO BE
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TAKEN BY THE ALLIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH NATO PROCEDURES AS SET
OUT IN SECTION V OF THIS DOCUMENT.

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TERMINOLOGY

20. WHEN NECESSARY FOR INTERNAL ALLIANCE PURPOSES OR IN FIRST
PHASE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE OTHER SIDE, FOR INSTANCE, DISTINCTIONS
AMONG NATO FORCES AND WARSAW PACT FORCES WILL BE MADE IN TERMS
OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET FORCES ON THE ONE HAND, AND "OTHER
NATO FORCES" AND "OTHER WARSAW PACT FORCES" ON THE OTHER HAND,
RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS FORCES.

21. THE TERMS "PHASE", "STAGE" AND "STEP" AS USED IN THIS
DOCUMENT DENOTE:

- PHASE: A MAJOR NEGOTIATING PERIOD RESULTING IN AN MBFR AGREEMENT (E.G. THE FIRST PHASE WITH REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET AND US FORCES);
- STAGE: A BLOC OF NEGOTIATING TIME OF UNDETERMINED LENGTH (E.G. THE INITIAL STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS);
- STEP: A NEGOTIATING MOVE (E.G. THE PRESENTATION OF OPENING SECRET

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STATEMENTS IN THE INITIAL STAGE).

PRINCIPLES

22. AS SET OUT IN THE GUIDELINES SECTION ABOVE, A BALANCED OUTCOME THAT WILL ENSURE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE IS A PRINCIPAL ALLIED OBJECTIVE. THIS OBJECTIVE, WHICH IS BASED ON THE CONCEPT THAT ALLIED SECURITY IS INDIVISIBLE, SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THE OTHER SIDE AT ALL STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ALLIED PROPOSALS SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THIS OBJECTIVE AND SHOULD GIVE FULL WEIGHT IN EACH PROVISION TO THE SPECIAL CONCERNS OF THE NATO FLANK COUNTRIES.

PREREDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES

23. PREREDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES RELATED TO IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA AIM AT BUILDING CONFIDENCE BY REDUCING THE RISK OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND AMBIGUOUS MILITARY ACTIVITY. SUCH CONSTRAINTS SHOULD BE DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS THE MEANS FOR INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES. THESE CONSTRAINTS WOULD OF NECESSITY BE APPLIED TO SPECIFIC FORCES IN RELATION TO SPECIFIC TERRITORIES; THEIR FORMULATION SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE FOCUSED ON FORCES RATHER THAN ON TERRITORIES (TO THE EXTENT FEASIBLE) (1). SUBJECT TO FURTHER URGENT EXAMINATION IN THE ALLIANCE(2) AND

(1) THESE CONSIDERATIONS APPLY EQUALLY TO PARAGRAPH 29

(2) THIS SHOULD INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF PROBLEMS WHICH COULD ARISE FROM THE APPLICATION OF THE MEASURES SET OUT IN (II) TO (IV) BELOW TO NATO FORCES OTHER THAN US FORCES IN THE AREA

TO THE CONSIDERATIONS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 14 ABOVE, THE ALLIES WILL SEEK AGREEMENT PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING MEASURES:

(I) PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES INTO THE AREA INCLUDING ROTATIONS;

(II) PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL FORCES IN THE AREA;

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((III) LIMITS ON SIZE, LOCATIONS, NUMBER AND DURATION OF
MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL FORCES IN THE AREA;)

(IV) EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL FORCES
IN THE AREA.

(THE MEASURES LISTED IN (II) AND (IV) ABOVE WILL FOCUS ON
ACTIVITIES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA. THE POSSIBILITY OF
APPLYING THESE MEASURES TO FORCES IN SPECIFIED AREAS OUTSIDE
OF THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA IS HOWEVER NOT EXCLUDED.)

REDUCTIONS

24. THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE FORM OF A
COMMON CEILING ON NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES IN THE NATO
GUIDELINES AREA REACHED IN TWO PHASES THROUGH A MAXIMUM 10 PERCENT
REDUCTION IN OVERALL NATO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND WARSAW PACT
REDUCTIONS TO THE RESULTING NATO FORCE LEVEL. THE COMMON CEILING
IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND (MANPOWER,
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COMBAT CAPABILITY(1) AND DEPLOYMENT.) OR
(FORCES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THEIR COMBAT CAPABILITY(1) IN TERMS
OF MANPOWER, HEAVY WEAPONRY AND DEPLOYMENT.)

25. WITHDRAWAL TO THEIR HOMELANDS OF SOME US AND SOVIET GROUND
FORCES FROM THE GUIDELINES AREA WOULD BE THE FIRST MOVE TOWARDS
THE OBJECTIVE DEFINED ABOVE, I.E. TOWARD APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE
FORM OF AN OVERALL NATO/WP GROUND (MANPOWER) (FORCE) COMMON CEILING
(AT APPROXIMATELY 700,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE). THE QUESTION OF
HOW SPECIFIC THE ALLIES WILL BE IN ILLUSTRATING THE COMMON CEILING
IN THE INITIAL STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS IS DISCUSSED IN SECTION III
BELOW.

26. REDUCTIONS OF ALLIED COMBAT CAPABILITY SHOULD BE KEPT TO
THE MINIMUM POSSIBLE WHILE THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS IN
WARSAW PACT COMBAT CAPABILITY SHOULD BE SECURED.

(1) REFERENCE IS MADE TO DOCUMENT AC/276-D(73)4

(27. IN THE FIRST PHASE THE SOVIETS SHOULD WITHDRAW A TANK
ARMY (5 DIVISIONS AND RELATED ELEMENTS INCLUDING EQUIPMENT)

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AND THE US WOULD WITHDRAW AN EQUAL PROPORTION OF THE MANPOWER
OF ITS STATIONED FORCES IN THE AREA(1). THIS WOULD MEAN
REDUCTIONS OF 15 PERCENT ON BOTH SIDES, OR ABOUT 68,000 SOVIET
SOLDIERS PLUS 1,700 TANKS AND ABOUT 29,000 US SOLDIERS.)

28. THIS REDUCTION CONCEPT HAS THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL FEATURES:

(1) NATO SHOULD BE PERMITTED FLEXIBILITY IN THE FORM OF REDUCTION ON GROUNDS OF ASYMMETRY OF CONDITIONS, WHEREAS REDUCTION OF WARSAW PACT FORCES BY MAJOR UNITS WITH THEIR EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE SOUGHT;

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(II) PROVISIONS CONCERNING DISPOSITION OF EQUIPMENT ON BOTH SIDES WILL TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE ASYMMETRIES WHICH PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO REINFORCE MORE RAPIDLY IN CENTRAL EUROPE THAN THE US. IN THIS SENSE, PROVISIONS SHOULD BE SOUGHT PERMITTING THE US TO STORE AND MAINTAIN US HEAVY EQUIPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE IN ORDER TO OFFSET THE FACILITY WITH WHICH THE SOVIET FORCES WITHDRAWN TO THE WESTERN PARTS OF THE SOVIET UNION COULD RETURN TO THEIR ORIGINAL POSITIONS;

((III) SOVIET WITHDRAWALS SHOULD INVOLVE DISBANDMENT WITHOUT REPLACEMENT FROM THE SOVIET STRATEGIC RESERVE.)

STABILIZING MEASURES, INCLUDING NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS TO ACCOMPANY REDUCTIONS

29. SUBJECT TO FURTHER EXAMINATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, THE ALLIES WILL SEEK AGREEMENT ON THE FOLLOWING MEASURES(2) APPLICABLE TO US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA:

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(I) LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENTS OF FORCES INTO THE AREA;

(1) (THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK TO LIMIT US WITHDRAWALS TO A COMBAT CAPABILITY APPROXIMATELY EQUIVALENT TO TWO BRIGADES)

(2) THESE MEASURES ARE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES IN PARAGRAPH 23 ABOVE. EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE MEASURES IN PARAGRAPH 23 WOULD BE SOUGHT IN PARALLEL WITH A NEGOTIATION OF REDUCTIONS IF THE EAST HAS NOT AGREED TO THEM PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS.

((II) LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENTS OF FORCES ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES WITHIN THE AREA. (PROPOSALS BY THE EAST FOR APPLICATION OF THESE CONSTRAINTS TO OTHER NATO FORCES OR FOR FORMULATIONS WHICH WOULD IMPLY AUTOMATIC APPLICATION OF SUCH CONSTRAINTS IN SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE REJECTED);)

((III) NOTIFICATION, WITHOUT ADVANCE WARNING, OF MAJOR MOVEMENTS OF FORCES WITHIN THE AREA;)

(IV) AGREEMENT TO RESPECT THE LEVELS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES ESTABLISHED BY A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT.

THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS THE MEANS FOR INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES.

30. IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND TO ELIMINATE OR MITIGATE ANY INCREASE IN THE THREAT TO THE FLANKS AS A RESULT OF MBFR IN THE CENTRAL REGION, CERTAIN PROVISIONS DESIGNED FOR USE WITH THE OTHER SIDE AT A TIME TO BE FIXED IN THE LIGHT OF THE TACTICAL NEGOTIATING SITUATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE URGENTLY STUDIED (WITH A VIEW TO AGREEMENT) (AND AGREED UPON) WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, SUCH AS:

(I) PROVISIONS FOR THE DISBANDMENT OF SOVIET WITHDRAWN FORCES WITHOUT REPLACEMENT FROM THE SOVIET STRATEGIC RESERVE;

(II) PROVISIONS TO PUT IN RESERVE THE SOVIET WITHDRAWN FORCES;
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(III) PROVISIONS TO PREVENT THE SOVIET WITHDRAWN FORCES TO BE DEPLOYED TO THE THREE WESTERN, THE LENINGRAD, ODESSA, KIEV, NORTHERN CAUCASIAN, AND TRANS-CAUCASIAN MILITARY DISTRICTS AS WELL AS TO THE NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES;

(IV) OTHER STABILIZING MEASURES, INCLUDING NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS, AS WELL AS VERIFICATION MEASURES.

31. AN IMPORTANT GOAL OF THE ALLIED APPROACH SHOULD BE TO ENSURE THAT ANY AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED OR UNDERMINED, FOR EXAMPLE BY MEANS OF AN INCREASE OF THE SOVIET FORCES IN HUNGARY. WHILE ALL POSSIBILITIES SHOULD BE STUDIED, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY THAT NON-CIRCUMVENTION WITH RESPECT TO HUNGARY COULD BE ASSURED THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF STABILIZING MEASURES SUCH AS THOSE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 29 ABOVE, THE BEST TIME TO DETERMINE WHICH SPECIFIC MEASURES WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE WILL BE AFTER THE OUTLINE OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT HAS TAKEN SHAPE IN NEGOTIATIONS AND ALLIED PROPOSALS REGARDING HUNGARY CAN BE TAILORED ACCORDINGLY, AND CAN ALSO BE ADVANCED WITH MINIMUM RISK OF EASTERN COUNTER-PROPOSALS TO EXPAND THE GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS OF NEGOTIATIONS BEYOND CENTRAL EUROPE. REFERENCE IS MADE IN THIS CONTEXT TO PARAGRAPH 17 OF THE GUIDELINES SECTION ABOVE. IN A NON-CIRCUMVENTION AGREEMENT CARE MUST BE TAKEN TO AVOID AN INSUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIED NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE SO WORDED THAT IT WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY THE WARSAW PACT AS IMPLYING A GENERAL INHIBITION OF ANY REINFORCEMENT OR REDEPLOYMENT OF CONCERNED NATO FORCES ANYWHERE IN ACE OUTSIDE THE GUIDELINES AREA. SUCH INHIBITION COULD AMOUNT TO A DE FACTO FREEZE OF THOSE FORCES WITHIN THE ENTIRE ACE AREA.

VERIFICATION

32. THE ALLIES WILL ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY SEEK AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS ARE BEING CARRIED OUT, TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, AND TO ENHANCE WARNING IN THE EVENT OF A PACT BUILD-UP. ALL VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED IN SUCH A SAY AS NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS MEANS OF INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES.

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33.

(A) NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL
BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF MBFR AGREEMENTS.

(B) IN ADDITION, THE ALLIES WILL SEEK AGREEMENT ON OVERT
VERIFICATION MEASURES(1) (I.E. TO ADVERSARY ON-SITE
INSPECTION) APPLICABLE TO THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA,
SUCH AS:

(I) REDUCTION OR ELIMINATION OF GEOGRAPHIC AND
OTHER EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON GROUND OBSERVATION;

(II) OBSERVATION OF AGREED WITHDRAWALS BY GROUND OBSERVERS;

(III) SEPCIAL MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS IN THE
REDUCTION AREA IN THE POST-MBFR PERIOD;

(IV) LIGHT AIR CAPABILITY (HELICOPTERS) FOR MOBILE
INSPECTION TEAMS.

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BEGIN BRACKETS (PARTICIPATION OF LIAISON OFFICERS OF THE HOST
COUNTRY IN ANY INSPECTION TEAM SHOULD BE ASSURED.) END BRACKETS

BEGIN BRACKETS ((C) THE TERRITORIAL RESTRICTION MADE ABOVE FOR OVERT
VERIFICATION MEASURES, I.E. THAT THEY ARE APPLICABLE
TO THE GUIDELINES AREA, DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE
POSSIBILITY OF LESS INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES
DESIGNED TO ACCOMPANY STABILIZING MEASURES OF THE
KIND SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 30 ABOVE.) END BRACKETS

(1) FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF DETAILED PROPOSALS IS REQUIRED

PROVISIONS FOR THE CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND
PHASE

34. THE ALLIES WILL NEGOTIATE FOR INCLUSION IN A FIRST
PHASE AGREEMENT OF LANGUAGE PROVIDING FOR A SECOND PHASE OF
NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR AGREEMENT TO THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON
CEILING FOR NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND -BEGIN BRACKETS (MANPOWER)
END BRACKETS - BEGIN BRACKETS (FORCES) END BRACKETS -
IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA. THE FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN

THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE THE AGGREGATES OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES REMAINING IN THE GUIDELINES AREA AFTER FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS. THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK FURTHER REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE SECOND PHASE. THE DETAILED NEGOTIATING POSITION FOR THE SECOND PHASE WILL BE DETERMINED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. ALTHOUGH ALLIED DECISIONS ON THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR FURTHER EXAMINATION AND REFLECTION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, -BEGIN BRACKETS (IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT) END BRACKETS - THIS SECOND PHASE WILL ON THE WESTERN SIDE FOCUS ON REDUCTIONS OF NON-US NATO FORCES(1). THE ALLIANCE WOULD WISH TO BE FREE TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF HOW THE WEIGHT OF THE REDUCTION REQUIRED FOR THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE NATIONAL FORCES INVOLVED.

SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT BE NEGOTIATED IN PARALLEL WITH NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTIONS ENVISAGED IN PARAGRAPHS 24 TO 28 ABOVE. THE ALLIES SHOULD THEREFORE NOT
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BECOME INVOLVED IN DISCUSSING DETAILS OF SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS WITH THE EAST EARLY IN NEGOTIATIONS OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT THE SECOND PHASE WOULD COMPLETE MOVEMENT TO THE OVERALL MBFR GOAL OF A COMMON CEILING ON NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND -BEGIN BRACKETS (MANPOWER) END BRACKETS - BEGIN BRACKETS (FORCE) END BRACKETS - MANPOWER IN THE GUIDELINES AREA.

(1) REDUCED FORCES OF NATO COUNTRIES WITHIN THE AREA SHOULD BE INACTIVATED AND PUT IN RESERVE STATUS

35. IN SUMMARY, IN THE FIRST PHASE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIES WILL SEEK SOVIET COMMITMENT TO -BEGIN BRACKETS (THE REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY) END BRACKETS - A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT INVOLVING ONLY US AND SOVIET REDUCTION SHOULD PROVIDE FOR A SECOND PHASE. THE ALLIEGS SHOULD ILLUSTRATE THEIR COMMON CEILING CONCEPT TO THE SOVIETS BY SAYING AT A SUITABLE MOMENT THAT IT WOULD BE ABOUT 700,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE AND TEST SOVIET REACTION TO THIS OVERALL FIGURE, BUT THEY SHOULD NOT INSIST ON SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THIS SPECIFIC FIGURE AS A PREREQUISITE TO NEGOTIATING THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT.

BEGIN BRACKETS (POST-REDUCTION CEILING

36. SUBSEQUENT TO THE SECOND PHASE THE OVERALL "COMMON CEILING" WOULD BE RESPECTED BY EACH SIDE WITH NO SUB-CEILINGS OTHER THAN THOSE RESPECTIVELY AFFECTING THE US AND SOVIET FORCES WITHIN THE COMMON CEILING.) END BRACKETS

PROVISIONS FOR REVIEW AND AMENDMENT OF, OR WITHDRAWAL FROM, A

POSSIBLE PHASE I AGREEMENT

37. (LANGUAGE TO BE PROVIDED LATER.)

III. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

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38. THIS SECTION CONTAINS ALLIED THINKING ON THE STRATEGY OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE INITIAL STAGE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, I.E. DURING THE FIRST FEW MONTHS, DEPENDING UPON THE POLITICAL AND NEGOTIATING SITUATION. IN PARTICULAR IT DISCUSSES THE MAJOR STEPS IN PRESENTATION OF THE ALLIED POSITION TO THE EAST, AS WELL AS THE QUESTIONS OF WHEN AND HOW THOSE STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN.

39. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME TO FORESEE THE ENTIRE COURSE OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS OR TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR THE WHOLE NEGOTIATION. THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE SCARCITY OF AUTHORITATIVE INFORMATION ON SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS PRECLUDE THIS.

40. AT THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WILL, IN FACT, BE UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE EAST'S ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS. DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST WILL ADD TO ALLIED KNOWLEDGE OF THE WARSAW PACT'S OBJECTIVES, WILL REVEAL SOME OF ITS STRATEGY AND COULD THEREFORE HAVE AN EFFECT UPON THE ATTITUDES TO BE TAKEN BY THE ALLIES. IT WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL UNDER THESE CONDITIONS FOR NATO TO SEEK TO DEFINE IN DETAIL ITS STRATEGY FOR MORE THAN THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. BEYOND THAT, THINKING ON STRATEGY MUST IN THE NATURE OF THINGS REMAIN OPEN.

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41. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE ALLIES ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A NEGOTIATING STRATEGY WHICH REQUIRES FREQUENT SHIFTS IN THEIR BASIC POSITION. WHILE IT MIGHT BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE TO BUILD A SERIES OF POSITIONS AND FALLBACKS IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE TRADING ROOM, SUCH AN APPROACH WILL NOT BE FESIBLE FOR A LARGE, COMPLEX MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION LIKE MBFR. ALLIED UNITY, WHICH WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR COMMON PURPOSES IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, WILL REQUIRE CO-ORDINATION OF NEGOTIAING POSITIONS, AND SUCH CO-ORDINATION NECESSARILY TAKES TIME. WESTERN COUNTRIES WILL FIND IT NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION TO PARLIAMENTS, AND IN LESSER DETAIL TO PUBLIC OPINION. AN INITIAL POSITION WITH SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL DEMANDS ON THE OTHER SIDE WOULD NOT BE PLAUSIBLE, AND FREQUENT SHIFTS TO FALLBACK POSITIONS WOULD BE CONFUSING AND UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE. MOREOVER, IF THE WEST WERE TO ATTEMPT TO BARGAIN FROM DELIBERATELY INFLATED POSITIONS, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO KEEP THE ALLIED STRATEGY AND ITS FALLBACKS FROM BECOMING KNOWN TO THE EAST. AT THE END OF SUCH A PROCESS, THE WEST WOULD STILL HAVE TO FACE THE PROBLEM OF PERSUADING THE EAST THAT ITS BASIC POSITION WAS
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IN FACT SERIOUSLY INTENDED.

42. TAKING THESE FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT, THE MOST EFFECTIVE GENERAL APPROACH TO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WILLBE TO TAKE A FIRM BASIC POSITION AND TO STICK TO IT AS THE WESTERN SIDE ATTEMPTS TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATION THROUGH DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GENERALIZATION DOWN TO THE SPECIFICS OF ACTUAL AGREEMENT. IT WILL BE A CARDINAL POINT OF NEGOTIATING STRATEGY FOR THE ALLIES TO MAINTAIN THEIR AGREED POSITION WITH MAXIMUM CONSISTENCE, DETERMINATION AND PERSEVERANCE.

43. THE INTIAL STAGE WOULD INCLUDE THE PRESENTATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF GENERAL VIEWPOINTS ON BOTH SIDES, EXPLORATION OF ATTITUDES, AND THE PRESENTATION OF THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL AND OF PREREDUCTION STABLIZING MEASURES. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD RETAIN FLEXIBILITY ON THE TEMPO OF THESE PRESENTATIONS DEPENDING UPON WHAT THE EAST MIGHT PUT FORWARD. SINCE WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE THE INVITING PARTY, BOTH THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES AND WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD EXPECT THE ALLIES TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN ADVANCING SUGGESTIONS, AND IT WOULD BE IN THE

WESTERN INTEREST TO DO SO. THE INITIAL STAGE WOULD CULMINATE WITH AN EFFORT TO ENGAGE THE SOVIETS IN A NEGOTIATION LEADING TO PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS.

STEPS IN INITIAL STAGE

44. THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING MAJOR STEPS:

45. OPENING STATEMENTS. OPENING STATEMENTS IN PLENARY SESSION WOULD BE OF A GENERAL, PROGRAMMATIC CHARACTER. THEY WOULD BE BASED UPON AGREED ALLIANCE POLICY WITH THE DETAILS CO-ORDINATED IN THE AD HOC GROUP IN MEETINGS STARTING IN BRUSSELS PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON 30TH OCTOBER.

46. THEMATIC MATERIAL FOR THE OPENING STATEMENTS SHOULD BE SUCH THAT IT WILL:

- BE SUPPORTED BY ALL ALLIED PARTICIPANTS;

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- DRIVE THE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD OUTCOMES PREFERRED BY THE ALLIES;

- BE CREDIBLE AND DEFENDABLE VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER SIDE;

- BE REASONABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE IN THE EYES OF WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION;

- LEAVE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE AND REFINEMENTS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

47. DEVELOPMENT OF MAIN THEMES. AFTER THE FIRST ROUND OF OPENING STATEMENTS, FURTHER PLENARY SESSIONS WOULD BE DEVOTED TO PRESENTATIONS DEVELOPING THE MAIN THEMES OF THE WESTERN STATEMENTS, INCLUDING SUCH MATTERS AS ASYMMETRIES IN THE MILITARY SITUATIONS OF EAST AND WEST, THREATENING ELEMENTS, THE NEED FOR PARITY AND A COMMON CEILING. THIS DEVELOPMENT OF MAIN THEMES WILL DESCRIBE THE OVERALL PROBLEM AS THE ALLIES SEE IT AND WILL DEFINE AND EMPHASIZE THE GENERAL CONCEPTS ON WHICH THE ALLIES WILL RELY IN THE FURTHER STAGES OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. IT WILL SET FORTH THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT IN WHICH SPECIFIC ALLIED PROPOSALS WILL LATER BE DEVELOPED.

48. THE EAST FOR ITS PART WILL PROBABLY ALSO FOLLOW UP ITS OPENING STATEMENTS WITH FURTHER ELABORATION. THIS EXCHANGE OF AMPLIFYING STATEMENTS WILL PROVIDE A BASIS FOR A GENERAL EXPLORATION OF EACH SIDE'S VIEWPOINT.

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49. FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE TO TIE TOGETHER THE STRANDS DEVELOPED IN THE EXPOSITION OF MAJOR THEMES BY THE INITIAL PRESENTATION OF AN ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. IT WOULD INCLUDE THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED IN SECTION II OF THIS PAPER.

50. AT THIS POINT, THE WESTERN PRESENTATION WOULD STILL BE IN GENERAL TERMS AND WE WOULD NOT EXPECT THE EAST TO REACT TO IT IN A DEFINITIVE MANNER. PRECISELY HOW SPECIFIC THE ALLIES WILL BE IN ILLUSTRATING THIS INITIAL PRESENTATION OF THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL WITH ACTUAL NUMBERS DRAWN FROM THE POSITION DESCRIBED IN SECTION II WILL DEPEND UPON THE TACTICAL SITUATION WHICH OBTAINS AT THE TIME. AT THIS POINT, THE ALLIES BELIEVE THAT THIS PRESENTATION SHOULD NOT GO ANY FURTHER INTO DETAIL ON THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THEIR POSITION THAN IS REQUIRED TO INDICATE THE PARAMETERS OF THEIR POSITION, E.G. THE COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE, THE FIGURE OF ABOUT 700,000 MEN FOR THE COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE, -BEGIN BRACKETS (THE TANK ARMY) END BRACKETS - AND THE 15 PER CENT FIGURES FOR THE FIRST PHASE.

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BUT A FINAL DECISION ON WHICH FIGURES SHOULD BE TABLED AT PARTICULAR POINTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS NEED NOT BE TAKEN NOW.

51. PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS. THE ALLIES WOULD THEN MOVE

TO MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE COMPONENTS OF THEIR FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. THE FIRST TOPIC TO BE TREATED IN MORE DETAIL THAN HAD BEEN DONE BEFORE WOULD BE PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS. THE ALLIES WOULD ENGAGE IN A VIGOROUS EFFORT TO PROBE SOVIET ATTITUDES ON THE TOPIC AND TO GET THE SOVIETS INTO NEGOTIATION OF AN AGREEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT. IT WILL BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO HAVE FIRST SKETCHED OUT THE GENERAL CONTEXT OF THE ALLIES' OVERALL POSITION IN WHICH THE PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS WOULD FIND THEIR PLACE; THE ALLIES WOULD THUS HAVE ANTICIPATED PROBABLE SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO ADDRESS CONSTRAINTS WITHOUT REGARD TO REDUCTIONS. DEPENDING ON HOW THE EAST REACTS, THE ALLIES WILL MAKE AN ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO REACH EARLY AGREEMENT ON PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS. IF SUCH AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE, THE ALLIES WILL MAKE A FURTHER DETERMINATION OF WHAT DEGREE OF FORMALITY MAY BE POSSIBLE FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT.

52. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS TOPIC WOULD CONCLUDE THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AS THE ALLIES CONCEIVE IT. THE NEXT STEP OF THE NEGOTIATION WOULD BE A DETAILED AND INTENSIVE PRESENTATION OF ALLIED PROPOSALS FOR THE FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING CONCERTED JUSTIFICATION AND ADVOCACY OF THE WHOLE REDUCTION PROGRAMME, LEADING TO THE COMMON CEILING.

53. PROCEDURES AND AGENDA. THE ALLIES WOULD NOT SEEK TO MAKE A SEPARATE STAGE OR STEP OF A DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURES OR AGENDA, LEST SOME OF THE SATISFACTORY RESULTS OF THE VIENNA PREPARATORY TALKS BE PUT AT HAZARD.

54. IN PARTICULAR, THE ALLIES WOULD RESIST ANY EASTERN ATTEMPT TO INVITE OTHER COUNTRIES TO JOIN THE TALKS OR TO RENEW THEIR PROPOSAL TO USE A SINGLE WORKING GROUP AS A VEHICLE FOR NARROWING THE EXISTING SCOPE OF ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ONLY TO THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

55. REGARDLESS OF THE SEQUENCE OF MAIN TOPICS DECIDED ON
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BY THE ALLIES FOR THE INITIAL STAGE, IT WOULD APPEAR FRUITLESS TO SEEK TO OBTAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT ON AN AGENDA INCORPORATING THIS SEQUENCE. CERTAIN POINTS, SUCH AS THE MODALITIES OF THE PRESENTATION OF OPENING STATEMENTS BY BOTH SIDES AND A SUBSEQUENT PHASE OF DEVELOPMENT OF MAIN THEMES FROM THESE STATEMENTS, WOULD NOT BE CONTROVERSIAL AND COULD BE SETTLED INFORMALLY PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON 30TH OCTOBER. BUT EFFORTS TO GAIN SOVIET CONCURRENCE TO INCLUDE, IN AN AGREED AGENDA, TOPICS SUCH AS THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL OR INDIVIDUAL ITEMS LIKE THE COMMON CEILING OR PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS WOULD BE UNPRODUCTIVE. MOREOVER, SUCH EFFORTS ARE UNNECESSARY. IT WAS AGREED IN THE VIENNA TALKS THAT EITHER SIDE COULD RAISE MATTERS OF INTEREST TO IT WITHOUT PROCEDURAL OBJECTION BEING RAISED. THE ALLIES THEREFORE

MAY PRESENT ANY GIVEN SUBJECT INCLUDING THEIR FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL AS ONE THEY INTEND TO DISCUSS AND NEGOTIATE ON. THE WARSAW PACT CAN DO THE SAME. THERE PROBABLY WILL BE DISAGREEMENT WITH THE EAST AS TO THE SEQUENCE IN WHICH TOPICS TABLED BY BOTH SIDES WILL BE HANDLED. THIS MIGHT BE RESOLVED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH USE OF THE CONCEPT THAT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SOUGHT TO PERMIT EACH SIDE TO DEVELOP POINTS OF GREATEST INTEREST TO IT IN PARALLEL. THE WEST COULD THEN ATTEMPT TO BRING THE EAST TO PARTICIPATE IN DETAILED DISCUSSION OF PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS IN RETURN FOR ALLIED AGREEMENT TO DEAL WITH REDUCTIONS NEXT.

IV. NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES

INTRODUCTION

56. IT WAS AGREED AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE EXPLORATORY TALKS OF 14TH MAY, 1973 THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS ON PARTICIPATION AND CERTAIN PROCEDURAL MATTERS WOULD ALSO BE APPLIED TO THE NEGOTIATIONS PROPER. THIS SECTION DESCRIBES FURTHER PROCEDURES WHICH THE ALLIES PREFER WITH REGARD TO THE ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS FOR THE INTERNAL USE OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AND NEGOTIATORS AND IS NOT INTENDED TO BE COMMUNICATED AS SUCH TO THE EAST.

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OBJECTIVE

57. NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES SHOULD BE SOUGHT WHICH CAN MOST

EFFICIENTLY ACHIEVE THE SUBSTANTIVE ALLIED OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN PRECEDING SECTIONS OF THIS PAPER.

FORMS OF NEGOTIATION WITH THE EAST

58. THE AD HOC GROUP WILL NORMALLY CHOOSE AMONG THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVES:

(I) PLENARY MEETINGS

(A) PLENARY MEETINGS CONSTITUTE THE FORUM PAR EXCELLENCE WHERE ALL PARTICIPANTS CAN EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS. THEY ARE CLEARLY THE BEST FORUM FOR PRESENTATION OF GENERAL MATERIAL AND VIEWS. SUBJECT TO THE REQUIREMENT DEFINED IN PARAGRAPH 57 ABOVE, PLENARY MEETINGS SHOULD BE THE PRINCIPAL FORUM FOR EAST-WEST
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DISCUSSIONS ON MBFR.

(B) WESTERN NEGOTIATORS SHOULD SEEK EASTERN AGREEMENT (I) THAT AS A MATTER OF CUSTOMARY PRACTICE -BEGIN BRACKETS (IN ADDITION TO THE ESTABLISHED RIGHT OF EITHER SIDE TO CONVENE PLENARIES) END BRACKETS - PLENARY MEETINGS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT REGULAR AND FREQUENT INTERVALS, E.G. ONCE EVERY TWO WEEKS DURING ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, IF POSSIBLE ON A SPECIFIED DAY. IT IS UNDERSTOOD WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THAT ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES WILL REQUEST AN EXTRAORDINARY PLENARY MEETING -BEGIN BRACKETS (WHENEVER ANY FOUR ALLIED PARTICIPANTS PROPOSE) END BRACKETS - BEGIN BRACKETS (WHENEVER AN ALLY FOR OVERRIDING REASONS PROPOSES) END BRACKETS - SUCH A REQUEST IN THE AD HOC GROUP. BEGIN BRACKETS (IN VIEW OF THE KNOW RESISTANCE OF EASTERN PARTICIPANTS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF BLOC-TO-BLOC NEGOTIATIONS, IT APPEARS INADVISABLE TO SEEK AMENDMENT OF THE AGREED PROCEDURES TO SPECIFICALLY PROVIDE FOR CONVENING AN EXTRAORDINARY PLENARY MEETING AT THE REQUEST OF ONE OF THE TWO ALLIANCES; THIS IS IN PRACTICE ALREADY ASSURED) END BRACKETS; AND (II) THAT WORKING GROUPS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED BY DECISIONS OF PLENARY MEETINGS AND REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THEIR DELIBERATIONS IN PLENARY MEETINGS.

(II) WORKING GROUPS

WORKING GROUPS, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF 28TH JUNE, 1973, MAY WELL PROVE TO BE AN EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATING INSTRUMENT. THESE WORKING

GROUPS SHOULD BE OPEN-ENDED, WITH EACH PARTICIPATING COUNTRY ABLE TO ATTEND OR NOT ACCORDING TO THE INTEREST WHICH IT ATTACHES TO THE QUESTION UNDER DISCUSSION, SO THAT MEMBERSHIP IN WORKING GROUPS MIGHT VARY. POSSIBLE EASTERN PROPOSALS TO CONSTITUTE A WORKING GROUP WITH MEMBERSHIP RESTRICTED TO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE REJECTED.

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(III) EMISSARIES

IT WILL AT TIMES BE APPROPRIATE TO USE THE TECHNIQUE OF EMISSARIES. THE AD HOC GROUP WILL DECIDE WHEN TO EMPLOY EMISSARIES, THEIR NUMBER AND IDENTITY, AND THEIR MANDATE; EMISSARIES WILL REPORT TO THE AD HOC GROUP.

(IV) INFORMAL CONTACTS

AS DURING THE EXPLORATORY TALKS, MEMBERS OF ALLIED DELEGATIONS WILL BE ENTERING INTO DISCUSSION WITH EASTERN DELEGATIONS IN BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL MEETINGS AND DURING SOCIAL GATHERINGS. IT IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE THAT, AS IN THE EXPLORATORY TALKS, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES ADHERE TO AGREED ALLIED POSITIONS OF THESE OCCASIONS AND REPORT AT THE NEXT MEETING OF THE AD HOC GROUP ANY SIGNIFICANT POINTS WHICH MAY ARISE FROM SUCH TALKS.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROCEDURE

59. THE AD HOC GROUP WILL DETERMINE WHAT ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE EAST CONCERNING PUBLIC AFFAIRS TREATMENT OF MBFR SHOULD BE SOUGHT PRIOR TO AND/OR DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

INDIVIDUAL EASTERN COUNTRIES

60. INTERNAL EASTERN COUNTRIES

60. INTERNAL EASTERN CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS ARE LIKELY TO BE LESS FLEXIBLE THAN OUR OWN. IT WILL BE DESIRABLE TO MAINTAIN ACTIVE LIAISON WITH THE NON-SOVIET EASTERN DELEGATIONS TO ENSURE THAT EACH OF THEM HAS A FULL OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS NATIONAL VIEWS TO ALL THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS IN TIMELY FASHION AND IS DENIED OPPORTUNITIES TO DISTORT OR DISRUPT THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR PURELY NATIONAL PURPOSES. THE AD HOC GROUP WILL CO-ORDINATE CONTACTS WITH EASTERN COUNTRIES TO ENSURE THAT WESTERN VIEWS ARE CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED AND WILL EXCHANGE

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INFORMATION ON BILATERAL CONTACTS.

V. INTRA-ALLIANCE CO-ORDINATION

INTRODUCTION

61. THE CONSULTATIVE PROGRAMME ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL ON 22ND NOVEMBER, 1972 HAS PROVED AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR INTRA-ALLIANCE CONSULTATION DURING THE EXPLORATORY TALKS, AND THOSE PARTS OF PO/72/413(REVISED) WHICH CONTINUE TO BE RELEVANT REMAIN VALID FOR THE FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS. THIS SECTION IS INTENDED TO PERFECT THESE ALLIANCE CONSULTATION ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS PROPER IN THE LIGHT OF EXPERIENCE IN THE EXPLORATORY TALKS AND FURTHER DELEBERATION.

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OBJECTIVE

62. THE CONSULTATIVE PROGRAMME IS DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN ALLIED UNITY, WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO THE SECURITY OF EVERY ALLY AND TO THE SUCCESS OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. ALLIED POSITIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE BEFORE THEY ARE PRESENTED TO THE EAST, AND THERE MUST BE ONLY ONE ALLIED POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE EAST. TO ACHIEVE THIS AIM, PROCEDURES ADOPTED UNDER THE PROGRAMME MUST PROVIDE FOR FULL AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION OF NATIONAL VIEWS AND INTERESTS IN THE COURSE OF DEVELOPING OF UNIFIED ALLIANCE POSITIONS FOR THE NEOGTIATIONS.

IT CAN BE EXPECTED THAT, IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE EASTERN SIDE WILL MAKE STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO DIVIDE THE ALLIANCE, TO PLAY ONE OFF AGAINST ANOTHER, AND IN PARTICULAR TO CREATE A SPLIT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT SUCH ATTEMPTS BE RESISTED. IT CANNOT REALISTICALLY BE EXPECTED THAT THE VIEWPOINT OF ALLIED COUNTRIES ON PARTICULAR QUESTIONS WILL NOT DIVERGE AT ANY POINT DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT DIFFERENCES SHOULD BE SETTLED AROUND THE TABLE IN THE COUNCIL AND IN THE AD HOC GROUP, AS APPROPRIATE.

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THE COUNCIL

EITHER

BEGIN BRACKETS (63. THE COUNCIL IS THE PERMANENT SUPERVISORY POLICY BODY FOR THE ALLIES IN MBFR. IT SHOULD BE THE FORUM BOTH FOR CO-ORDINATING GENERAL POLICY AND FOR ENSURING THAT THE CONDUCT OF THE NEGOTIATION IS CONSISTENT WITH THIS GENERAL POLICY.) END BRACKETS

OR

BEGIN BRACKETS (63. IT IS THE TASK OF THE COUNCIL TO ENSURE CONSULTATIONS LEADING TO AGREEMENT ON ALL QUESTIONS OF OBJECTIVES, POLICY AND STRATEGY. IT SHOULD BE THE FORUM BOTH FOR CO-ORDINATING GENERAL NEGOTIATING POLICY AND FOR ENSURING THAT THE CONDUCT OF THE NEGOTIATION IS CONSISTENT WITH THIS GENERAL POLICY, TO WHICH ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WILL ALSO REFER BACK WHENEVER A POLICY QUESTION ARISES IN WHICH IT HAS NOT TAKEN ALREADY A DECISION.) END BRACKETS

THE AD HOC GROUP

64. ACTING ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS AND ON GUIDANCE ON GENERAL POLICY AND GOALS PROVIDED BY THE COUNCIL, AND REMAINING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE COUNCIL, THE NEGOTIATORS ON THE SPOT, MEETING IN THE AD HOC GROUP, WILL HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALLIED TACTICS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR CONDUCTING THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES.

ORGANIZATION OF THE AD HOC GROUP

65. ALL ALLIES WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE AD HOC GROUP. THE HEADS OF ALLIED DELEGATIONS IN VIENNA OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES WILL CONSTITUTE THE AD HOC GROUP. THE SECRETARY GENERAL AS WELL AS NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES WILL BE REPRESENTED IN THE AD HOC GROUP. ALL MEMBERS OF THE AD HOC GROUP WILL PARTICIPATE ON AN EQUAL BASIS. THE CHAIRMANSHIP

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OF THE AD HOC GROUP WILL ROTATE WEEKLY IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER SO AS TO GIVE ALL ALLIES AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF CHAIRMANSHIP. MEETINGS OF THE AD HOC GROUP WILL BE CONVENED BY THE CHAIRMAN AT THE REQUEST OF ANY HEAD OF A PARTICIPATING DELEGATION OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE. THE AD HOC GROUP WILL ESTABLISH PROCEDURES FOR ITS OWN INTERNAL MEETINGS.

DECISIONS WITHIN THE AD HOC GROUP

66. THE AD HOC GROUP SHOULD ARRIVE AT ALL NECESSARY DECISIONS ON THE BASIS OF CONSENSUS IN A SPIRIT OF ALLIED SOLIDARITY. IT SHOULD ALLOW THE OPPORTUNITY FOR FULL AND FRANK DISCUSSION, FOR THE EXPRESSION OF ALL VIEWPOINTS, AND FOR FULL CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEMS ADDRESSED BY IT, TAKING THE NECESSARY TIME FOR IT.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE AD HOC GROUP

67. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WILL TRANSMIT GUIDANCE FROM THE COUNCIL TO THE MEMBERS OF THE AD HOC GROUP THROUGH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GROUP. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE AD HOC GROUP, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS, WILL SUBMIT IN HIS NAME A WRITTEN REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON DEVELOPMENTS IN VIENNA DURING THE WEEK OF HIS TENURE. WHILE ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDER WAY IN VIENNA THE AD HOC GROUP WILL FREQUENTLY REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AT FIXED DATES, ENSURING REGULARITY OF REPORTING AND ENABLING ADVANCE PLANNING, I.E. ONCE EVERY TWO OR THREE WEEKS, AT A DATE CONVENIENT TO THE COUNCIL. THE REPORTING TEAM OF THE AD HOC GROUP WILL BE HEADED BY THE AD HOC GROUP'S CHAIRMAN OF THE WEEK PRECEDING THE REPORTING DAY. HE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY TWO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE AD HOC GROUP ASSURING THAT IN EACH INSTANCE A FLANK REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE A MEMBER OF THE TEAM.

SPECIAL REPORTS BY THE AD HOC GROUP TO THE COUNCIL

68. (I) IN CASES OF MAJOR NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE AD HOC GROUP WILL MAKE A SPECIAL JOINT REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, TO BE PRESENTED TO THE COUNCIL IN PERSON BY THE CHAIRMAN, AND TWO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP AS IN PARAGRAPH 67 ABOVE, ANALYSING THE DEVELOPMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
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AND, IF POSSIBLE, SETTING FORTH A RECOMMENDED APPROACH.

(II) WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF COUNCIL GUIDANCE, THE AD HOC GROUP SHOULD HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESOLVING DIVERGENCIES OF OPINION AMONG ITS

MEMBERS - BEGIN BRACKETS (WITH REGARD TO BOTH SUBSTANTIVE OR
PROCEDURAL ISSUES) END BRACKETS. ALLIED SOLIDARITY REQUIRES
THAT EVERY ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO FIND RAPID
AND USABLE COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS. IN MAJOR
MATTERS WHERE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION CANNOT EASILY
BE RESOLVED, NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE OTHER SIDE ON
THIS TOPIC - BEGIN BRACKETS (MAY) END BRACKETS - BEGIN BRACKETS
(SHOULD) END BRACKETS - BE SUSPENDED, BEGIN BRACKETS (NORMALLY)
END BRACKETS - BEGIN BRACKETS (AS LONG AS NECESSARY, BUT PREFERABLY)
END BRACKETS FOR NO
MORE THAN A WEEK. IN CASES WHERE IT DOES NOT
PROVE POSSIBLE TO ARRIVE AT COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS
TO DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WITHIN THE AD HOC
GROUP IN A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME, THE PROBLEM
SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE COUNCIL. IN SUCH CASES,
THE AD HOC GROUP SHOULD MAKE A SPECIAL JOINT
REPORT TO THE COUNCIL IN PERSON BY THE CHAIRMAN
ACCOMPANIED BY TWO OTHER MEMBERS, SETTING FORTH
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AND THE ALTERNATIVE
VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF GROUP MEMBERS.

(III) IN CASES REQUIRING FORMULATION OF FURTHER
GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP, THE COUNCIL WILL
ORGANIZE ITS WORK IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BE ABLE
TO MAKE ITS VIEWS KNOWN EXPEDITIOUSLY.

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